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TAXATION FEDERAL ESTATE TAX POWERS OF APPOINTMENT WHEN PROPERTY SUBJECT THERETO Is TAXABLE As PART OF DoNEE's
EsTATE EFFECT OF A COMPROMISE The decedent was a beneficiary
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of a trust established by his father and of two other trusts created by his mother.
From his father's trust the decedent was to receive a portion of the income prior
to his twenty-eighth birthday, when he was to receive the principal and accumulated income. His mother's trusts gave him the income for life, subject to certain
restrictions before he attained the age of twenty-eight. Under all three trusts
he had a general testamentary power of appointment. In case of nonexercise of
this power, decedent's descendants were to be default takers under the donor's
will, or, if he had no descendants, his brothers and sisters and their representatives were to take per stirpes. Decedent died before reaching twenty-one, leaving
two minor children and several brothers and sisters in whose favor he attempted
to exercise the power of appointment. The validity of the exercise of the power
was questioned and the brothers and sisters claimed that they were entitled to
the property either as appointees or as default takers. A compromise agreement
was entered into, whereby the children were each given a percentage of the
property involved, the rest to be held in trust for the brothers and sisters pursuant to the default provisions of the donor's will. In approving the compromise,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina 1 mentioned both of the claims made by
the brothers and sisters as a basis for supporting the share given to them. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue attempted to tax the property subject to the
power under the Federal Estate tax. Both the Board of Tax Appeals 2 and the
Circuit Court of Appeals 3 declared it not taxable. Held, a portion of the property may be taxable under section 302 (f) of the Revenue Act of 1926 4 as
property passing under a general power of appointment exercised by the decedent
by will, but none of it is taxable under section 302 (a) as property in which the
decedent had an interest. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company of
Baltimore; (U.S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 925.
Much difficulty has been experienced by the courts in determining the taxability of sums received from out-of-court settlements of will disputes. Under state
inheritance statutes the courts have gone both ways. Some have held that such
sums are inheritances for inheritance tax purposes 5 while others have said that
they arise from contractual agreement and cannot affect inheritance taxation. 6
In Lyeth v. Hoey 1 the Supreme Court declared that in construing federal tax
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N. C. 578, 182 S. E. 341 (1935).
42 B. T. A. 145 (1940).
8 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941) 121 F. (2d} 307.
.
4 44 Stat. L. 70 (1926), 26 U.S. C. (1940), § 8II (f).
5 Pepper's Estate, 159 Pa. 508, 28 A. 353 (1894); Taylor v. State, 40 Ga. App.
295, 149 S. E. 321 (1929); People ex rel. Attorney General v. Rice, 40 Colo. 508,
91 P. 33 (1907); State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 172 N. W.
902 (1919); Estate of Thorson, 150 Minn. 464, 185 N. W. 508 (1921).
6 Ellis v. Hunt, 228 Mass. 39, u6 N. E. 956 (1917); Matter of Cook, 187
N. Y. 253, 79 N. E. 991 (1907); English v. Crenshaw, 120 Tenn. 531, 110 S. W.
210 (1908}; Estate of Wells, 142 Iowa 255, 120 N. W. 713 (1909); Estate of
Graves, 242 Ill. 212, 89 N. E. 978 (1909); Estate of Rossi, 169 Cal. 148, 146 P.
430 (1915); Cochran's Exr. v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 656, 44 S. W. (2d) 603
(1931); MacKenzie v. Wright, 31 Ariz. 272, 252 P. 521 (1927); In re O'Neill's
Estate, III N. J. Eq. 378, 162 A. 425 (1932}; Lynchburg Trust & Savings Bank v.
Commonwealth, 162 Va. 73, 173 S. E. 548 (1934).
7 305 U.S. 188, 59 S. Ct. 155 (1938).
1
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laws the question was one of federal law, and not of state law as had previously
been ruled, 8 and held that the sum received in settlement is of the same character
for tax purposes as the claim which is compromised.9 Thus it was decided that
the amount received in settlement by an heir who withdrew his claim that the
will was a forgery was exempt under the income tax as being received as "a
gift, bequest, devise or inhentance." 10 The Supreme Court used the same analysis in the principal case, but the real problem arose from the fact that the brothers
and sisters claimed both as appointees under the power of appointment, and as'
takers in default. To the extent that the brothers' and sisters' share was to be
imputed to the claim based on the purported exercise of the power of appointment, the estate should be taxed,11 but to the extent the share was to be imputed
to the claim based on the brothers' and sisters' status as default takers the estate
should escape taxation. 12 The Court refused to discuss the merit of either of the
claims, and the problem of apportionment was thrown into the lap of the Board
of Tax Appeals. 13 Although the result seems highly refined, and incapable of
exact solution in terms of apportionment, still it follows as almost a necessary
consequence from the practice of taxing property subject to a general power of
appointment only when the property passes by an exercise of that power. 14 The
argument was made in the principal case that the decedent, having the only
8 Smith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 1st, 1935) 78 F. (2d)
897; Lyeth v. Hoey, (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 141; White v. Thomas,
(C. C. A. 5th, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 147, seems to lay down a further principle which
is scarcely justifiable, i. e., that the property received in settlement must be of the
very same character as the property claimed in order to be considered of the same
character for taxation purposes. The taxpayers in that case contended that the amount
they received in settlement should partake of the character of a gift for taxation purposes. The court rejected their claim, for they had received money in settlement and
not part of the land which they originally claimed had been devised to them. See the
criticism in 54 HARv. L. REV. 1072 (1941). A contrary result to that reached in
Lyeth v. Hoey is possible, of course, but such a result has the disadvantage of -causing
a more or less inequitable distribution of the tax burden, and it would put a premium
upon fighting will contests until the bitter end.
10 Sec. 22(b) (3) of the Revenue Act of 1936, 49 Stat. L. 1657, 26 U. S. C.
( 1940), § 22 (b) ( 3), excludes gifts, bequests, devises and inheritances from taxable
income.
11 Sec. 302 (f) of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L. 70, 26 U.S. C. (1940),
§ 811 (f), makes all property passing under a general power of appointment exercised
by will taxable as a part of the decedent's gross estate.
12 It has always been held that when the decedent fails to exercise the power of
appointment, the property subject to the power is not taxable as a part of his gross
estate. Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U.S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354 (1935). To the extent
that the claim of the brothers and sisters arose as appointees and default takers together, it would seem that the estate would escape taxation under the rule of Helvering
v. Grinnell, i.e., that an exercise of the power in favor of the default takers is no
exercise so far as taxation purposes are concerned.
13 Principal case, 62 S. Ct. at 930.
14 See the criticism in I PAUL, FEDERAL EsTATE AND G1FT TAXATION, § 9.27
(1942); Griswold, "Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARV.
L. REV. 929 (1939).
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vested beneficial rights in these trusts and a power to appoint the remainders,
had substantially full ownership, and that the property should be included in his
gross estate under section 302 (a) as property in which he had an interest.15
The Court rejected the argument mainly because of the legislative history of
the statute.16 It would seem that Congressional action is necessary to remove the
distinction between exercise and nonexercise of the power as a criterion of tax
liability.
Charles J. O'Laughlin

15 A similar argument was successful under the income tax. In Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940), the Supreme Court held that income
from short-term trusts was taxable to the settlor under the broad provisions of § 22
(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 686, 26 U. S. C. (1940), § 22 (a),
despite the fact that Congress had dealt specifically with trusts in § 166 and had
excluded all irrevocable trusts from its scope. See I PAUL, FEDERAL EsTATE AND
G1FT TAXATION,§ 4.12 (1942).
16 Principal case, 62 S. Ct. at 927.

